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Abstract 
An important aim of cognitive science is to build 
computational models that account for a large number of 
phenomena but have few free parameters, and to obtain more 
veridical values for the models’ parameters by successive 
approximations. A good example of this approach is the 
CHREST model (Gobet & Simon, 2000), which has 
simulated numerous phenomena on chess expertise and in 
other domains. In this paper, we are interested in the 
parameter the model uses for shifting chess pieces in its 
mind’s eye (125 ms per piece), a parameter that had been 
estimated based on relatively sparse experimental evidence. 
Recently, Waters and Gobet (2008) tested the validity of this 
parameter in a memory experiment that required players to 
recall briefly presented positions in which the pieces were 
placed on the intersections between squares. Position types 
ranged from game positions to positions where both the piece 
distribution and location were randomised. CHREST, which 
assumed that pieces must be centred back to the middle of the 
squares in the mind’s eye before chunks can be recognized, 
simulated the data fairly well using the default parameter for 
shifting pieces. The sensitivity analysis presented in the 
current paper shows that the fit was nearly optimal for all 
groups of players except the grandmaster group for which, 
counterintuitively, a slower shifting time gave a better fit. The 
implications for theory development are discussed.     
Keywords: chess; computer modelling; expertise; mental 
imagery; learning; recall task; sensitivity analysis. 
Introduction 
As argued powerfully by Newell (1990) and others, one 
important aim of cognitive science is to develop 
computational models that account for an increasingly large 
number of phenomena; the number of free parameters in the 
models should be kept low, and their value should be made 
more precise by successive approximations. This aim has 
inspired the development of CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy 
and REtrieval STructures; see Gobet et al. 2001, for an 
overview). CHREST is a model of perception, learning, and 
expertise that explains the acquisition of knowledge by the 
growth of a discrimination net, where chunks and templates 
are stored. It also provides mechanisms explaining how 
long-term memory (LTM) knowledge directs eye 
movements. CHREST has accounted for data on chess 
perception, learning, and memory, the use of diagrammatic 
information in physics, the acquisition of vocabulary, and 
the acquisition of syntactic structures. The model has 
several capacity and time parameters that have been set 
using empirical data and similar parameters used in other 
computational models. While these parameters have turned 
out to be robust in the sense that they have enabled the 
simulation of numerous empirical data, little work has been 
done to establish the extent to which their value is optimal 
or near-optimal. In this paper, we address this question by 
considering a time parameter important in simulating chess 
players’ mental imagery. This choice is justified not only by 
the theoretical importance of the parameter, but also by the 
long-term practical impact that a better understanding of 
expert mental imagery could have for training and 
education. We also note that CHREST is one of the very 
few computational models currently able to make 
quantitative predictions about expert behaviour in tasks 
requiring mental imagery. 
We first review the experimental evidence on chess 
mental imagery, some of which was used by De Groot and 
Gobet (1996) for estimating our target parameter, and then 
provide an overview of CHREST. Next, we present in some 
detail a recent study by Waters and Gobet (2008), where 
CHREST’s predictions about the role of chunking in mental 
imagery were studied through a recall task. One aim of their 
study was to indirectly test CHREST’s time parameter for 
shifting a piece in the mind’s eye by half a square 
(thereafter, shifting parameter), and we summarize how the 
model’s predictions were met by the results of the 
experiment they carried out. The main part of the paper 
consists in a sensitivity analysis, where we examine to what 
extent CHREST’s simulations can be improved by 
searching the optimal value of the shifting parameter, which 
was set a priori in the original simulations. The discussion 
section highlights how CHREST could be improved using 
the outcome of the sensitivity analysis.  
Mental Imagery in Chess: Experimental Data 
The available experimental evidence on mental imagery in 
chess comes from two main sources: Experiments on 
blindfold chess, and experiments that have attempted to 
measure the time needed to move a piece in the mind’s eye. 
Blindfold Chess 
Blindfold chess is a spectacular form of chess where players 
play one or several games simultaneously without seeing the 
board. In a series of ingenious experiments (Saariluoma, 
1991; Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1997), games were 
presented aurally or visually, with or without interfering 
tasks. With aural presentation, the games were dictated 
using a standard chess notation (the algebraic chess 
notation). With visual presentation, only the current move 
was displayed on a computer screen (the remainder of the 
pieces were absent). For the present purposes, the most 
significant finding was that while performance was not 
affected by the presentation mode (auditory or visual), the 
modality of interfering tasks (verbal or visual) had a 
significant effect. Blindfold chess does not appear to rely 
much on verbal working memory, but makes heavy use of 
visuo-spatial working memory, with the qualification that 
the importance of visuo-spatial working memory is limited 
to the early stages of encoding. Once stored in long-term 
memory (LTM), information about positions becomes 
insensitive to tasks interfering with working memory. 
Finally, by manipulating the randomness of positions or the 
location of groups of pieces, Saariluoma (1991) obtained 
additional support for Chase and Simon’s (1973) hypothesis 
that perceptual chunks underpin skill in chess.   
Imagery Time Tasks  
The second group of experiments attempted to examine the 
variables influencing the time to carry out chess moves in 
the mind’s eye. Church and Church (1977) required a single 
Class A player to report whether the black King was being 
attacked (or not) by a lone white piece. The decision time 
(for the check verification task) increased as a function of 
the distance between the two pieces for diagonal moves, but 
not for horizontal/vertical moves. Milojkovic (1982) 
instructed participants to mentally carry out a particular 
capture in a subsequently presented position (P1). The 
chessboard remained on the screen as the capture was 
mentally performed (“P2”). The task was to decide whether 
the (imagined) position after capture (“P2”) was the same as 
another position (P3) (which appeared after P1 had been 
removed from view). The Master’s reaction times were 
faster than those of the novices. With both skill levels, 
reaction times depended on the distance between the two 
pieces involved in the capture. Novices, but not the Master, 
took longer with diagonal moves than with 
horizontal/vertical moves. Gruber (1991), who used the 
largest sample size of the studies mentioned in this section 
(24 experts, 24 novices), obtained the same results as 
Milojkovic in a check verification task: A significant skill 
effect, a significant distance effect, and a significant 
interaction between skill and movement-type. 
In Bachman and Oit’s (1992) experiment, chess players 
and non-players were presented with either an 8 x 8 grid or 
a chessboard. They were then required to close their eyes, 
listen to a sequence of instructions about the moves of a 
spot or a chess piece (up, down, right or left), and imagine 
following the spot or piece at it moves. At the end of the 
sequence of moves, participants had to indicate the end 
position of the spot or the piece. There were no skill 
differences in the moving-spot (8 x 8 grid) condition, but 
non-players made more errors than chess players in the 
moving-chess piece (chessboard) condition. Furthermore, in 
the moving-chess piece condition, skilled players tended to 
show Stroop-like interference when the piece was required 
to move in an unnatural fashion. For example, chess players 
found it difficult to imagine a Bishop moving horizontally 
(which is incongruent with its typical diagonal movement).   
The CHREST Theory 
CHREST consists of four main components: an LTM, 
where chunks are stored; a visual short-term memory (STM) 
with a capacity of 3 items; a mind’s eye system; and a 
simulated eye. LTM chunks are accessed by traversing a 
discrimination net (Simon, 1979). A discrimination net is a 
treelike structure consisting of a set of nodes connected by 
links. The links have tests, which are applied to check 
features of the external stimuli. The outcome of each test 
determines which link will be taken below a node. When a 
new object is presented to the model, it is sorted through the 
discrimination net, starting from the root node, until no 
further test applies. When a node is reached at the end of 
this process, the object is compared with the image of the 
node, which is the internal representation of the object. Two 
learning mechanisms are used. If the image under-represents 
the object, new features are added to the image, by the 
process of familiarization, which takes 2 s. If the 
information in the image and the object differ on some 
feature or some sub-element, a new link and a new node are 
created below the current node, by the process of 
discrimination, which takes 8 s. 
Chunks that are often recognized evolve into more 
complex data structures, known as templates, which have 
slots allowing variables to be instantiated rapidly (filling in 
information into a template slot takes 250 ms). In particular, 
information about piece location, piece type, or chunks can 
be (recursively) encoded into template slots. Slots are 
created at chunks where there is substantial variation in 
squares, pieces, or groups of pieces in the test links below. 
In addition to slots, templates contain a core, basically 
similar to the information stored in chunks. Chunks and 
templates can be linked to other information stored in LTM, 
such as (sequences of) moves.  
The mind’s eye stores perceptual structures, both from 
external inputs and from memory stores, for a short time (cf. 
Chase & Simon, 1973). The visuo-spatial information stored 
there can be subjected to visuo-spatial mental operations; in 
chess, it is the place where, for example, the trajectories of 
pieces are computed. The information stored in the mind’s 
eye decays rapidly and needs to be updated either by inputs 
from the external world or by inputs from memory 
structures. This assumption is in line with Kosslyn’s 
influential work on mental images (e.g., Kosslyn, 1994).  
CHREST makes several assumptions about the operations 
that are carried out in the mind’s eye. For chess, these 
operations include the time to move a piece mentally. These 
mental operations are assumed to take a definite amount of  
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Figure 1: Examples of the 5 types of stimuli used in the Gobet and Waters (2003; positions 1 to 5) and Waters and Gobet 
(2008; positions 6 to 10). "tr" stands for "truly randomized." (To make comparison easier, the same original position is used 
in the 10 conditions; different positions were actually used in the experiments.) 
 
time and are carried out serially (see Kosslyn, Cave, 
Provost, & Von Gierke, 1988, for data supporting the 
assumption that mental images are generated serially). In 
addition, the theory postulates definite mechanisms linking 
LTM, short-term memory (STM), and the mind’s eye (see 
Waters & Gobet, 2008, for details). The eye movements are 
directed from a combination of acquired knowledge, 
mediated by the structure of the discrimination net, and 
heuristics, such as fixating a part of the board about which 
nothing is known yet (De Groot & Gobet, 1996). 
Waters and Gobet’s (2008) Study 
De Groot and Gobet (1996, p. 236) proposed definite 
parameters for the time to move pieces in the mind’s eye. 
These parameters were derived from the few experiments 
available, which sometimes led to inconsistent results (see 
above). Based on this admittedly imperfect evidence, De 
Groot and Gobet opted for two parameters: first, a base 
parameter, set to 100 ms both for masters and novices; 
second, a square parameter, set to 50 ms for the masters and 
100 ms for the novices. The base parameter refers to the 
time needed to start the process of generating a move, while 
the square parameter estimates the time needed to move a 
piece over one square in the mind’s eye. For example, when 
a strong player imagines a bishop moving from the square 
“a1” (left bottom corner of the board) to the square “h8” 
(right top corner of the board), CHREST predicts that this 
takes 450 ms (100 ms to start the process and 7 x 50 ms per 
square). Although these parameters are plausible—they 
were derived from empirical data—they had not been tested 
directly, and the aim of Waters and Gobet’s (2008) study 
was to directly test their validity. (As there were no novices 
in their experiment, Waters and Gobet used only the 
“masters” parameters.) 
 Waters and Gobet created “intersection positions,” where 
the pieces were placed at the intersection of squares, rather 
than being placed in the middle of the squares (see Figure 
1). If chunks are recognized without the need to re-center 
pieces, then recall on the intersection positions should not 
differ from that on the standard positions. If, on the other 
hand, pieces need to be re-centered before chunks can be 
recognized, then there should be a decrease in performance. 
This decrease can be predicted by CHREST, and the 
parameter to shift pieces diagonally is crucial for these 
predictions. 
In addition, the ease by which chunks could be accessed 
in LTM was manipulated using positions with different 
levels of structure. These positions, which contained 25 
pieces on average, varied from game positions to fully 
randomized positions (see Figure 1, and see Gobet & 
Waters, 2003, for the detail of how these positions were 
constructed). Game positions were taken from master games 
without any change. Random positions were constructed by 
randomly reassigning the pieces of a game position to new 
squares. In “truly” random positions, not only the location 
of the pieces was randomized, but also the distribution of 
pieces (e.g., there could be 12 white kings in a position, 
contrary to the standard chess rules). One-third and two-
third truly random positions were positions where 1/3 and 
2/3 of the pieces were truly randomized. On intersection 
positions, the end product was manipulated by shifting all 
pieces to the south-east corners of the squares.   
The same nets as those used by Gobet and Waters (2003) 
in their simulation of standard positions were selected. 
These nets, defined by the number of LTM chunks, were 
selected as they fairly closely matched the mean recall of 
the four groups of human subjects on standard game 
positions. They were created by letting the program scan a 
large number of positions, so that chunks and templates can 
be acquired. The result of the simulations, both for standard 
and intersection positions, is shown in Figure 2 (left panel).  
These predictions were tested with a sample of 36 
players: a “grandmasters” group, a “masters/experts” group, 
a “Class A/B players” group (consisting of moderate to 
strong club players), and a “Class C/D players” group 
(consisting of weak club players). On each trial, a position 
was presented for 5 s. The screen then was blank for 2 s, and 
then an empty chess board appeared.  The participants were 
instructed to try to recall the positions as completely and as 
accurately as possible. Further details of the participants and 
experimental procedures are available in Waters and Gobet 
(2008). 
Figure 2 (right panel) shows the results. Recall was 
impaired on the intersection positions compared to the 
standard positions. This impairment was especially 
pronounced on the intersection game positions. Skill effects 
were present on the intersection game positions, but not on 
the other intersection positions.  
Interestingly, participants were better at recalling bishops 
than knights on the intersection positions (but not the 
standard positions), which is in line with Bachman and Oit’s 
(1992) study reviewed above and also supports the 
hypothesis that mental imagery played a role in this task: the 
mental transformations were easier for the bishops than the 
knights.  
These results suggest that, as predicted by CHREST, 
human information processing is slowed down by the 
processes of carrying out mental transformations to re-
centre pieces, which impairs the ability to access 
chunks/templates in the intersection game positions. 
However, while the fit for the simulation with intersection 
positions is good (all r2 >= .90; see Table 1, top), there is 
still room for improvement. Given that the re-centring 
process occurs often, and given the importance of the 125 
ms in this process, examining this parameter is a natural 
place to start for improving the model’s fit to the data. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The transition-time of 125 ms was chosen for theoretical 
reasons, based on the estimate provided by De Groot and 
Gobet (1996) for moving a piece diagonally in the mind’s 
eye. To investigate the role of this parameter, we 
systematically varied it from 0 ms to 450 ms. The 
simulations otherwise followed the same procedure as that 
used in Waters and Gobet (2008). 
 
Methods 
We used the same version of CHREST and the same 
networks as those used by Gobet and Waters (2003) and 
Waters and Gobet (2008). During the simulations, the model 
moves its simulated eye around the board, and attempts to 
recognize chunks (or templates). The presentation time for 
each position was 5 s. Given this relatively short 
presentation time, the model could add information to LTM 
by familiarization and by filling in information into a 
template slot, but not by discrimination. 
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Figure 2:  Percentage of correct pieces as a function of type of position for standard positions (upper panel) and intersection 
positions (lower panel). Left: computer simulations; right: human data. Human data are from Gobet and Waters (2003) for 
the standard positions, and from Waters and Gobet (2008) for the intersection positions.  
The model attempts to memorize the intersection 
positions by carrying out the following steps: (a) in the 
mind’s eye, up to three pieces within the external visual 
field are moved serially to the centre of the square (as with 
previous versions of CHREST, the external visual field is 
defined as the set of squares +/- 2 squares away from the 
fixation point); (b) the (shifted) pattern of pieces is sorted 
through the discrimination net; and (c) if a chunk is 
recognized for this pattern, it is handled in the same way as 
with previous simulations using standard positions (Gobet 
& Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003); that is, when an 
external pattern leads to the successful recognition of an 
LTM chunk, a pointer to the chunk is placed in visual STM.  
During recall, the model shifts the pieces back to their 
intersection location. With the exception of these 
mechanisms for handling intersection positions, CHREST’s 
mechanisms are the same as in previous simulations (i.e., 
simulations with standard positions). In addition, they are 
the same in all position types (from game to truly random). 
Thus, differences in recall performance reflect the 
probability that patterns present in the positions will elicit 
chunks or templates in LTM. 
To simplify the simulations, the two parameters defined 
by De Groot and Gobet (1996) were considered as a single 
parameter, which is the time needed to shift a piece across 
half a square. This time was systematically varied from 0 
ms to 450 ms, by steps of 25 ms. Thus, there were 380 
different conditions: 4 (network sizes) x 5 (position types) x 
19 (shifting time values). For each condition, 500 positions 
were used.  
Results 
As expected, recall was better across all position types and 
net sizes when transition-time was briefer (all correlations 
larger than -.87 in absolute value, and all p < .001). As 
measures of goodness of fit with the human data, we 
computed r2, the average absolute deviation (AAD), and the 
sum of squared errors (SSE). R square indicates how well a 
model captures the pattern of means of the empirical data. 
SSE and AAD provide information about the deviation of 
the model data from the empirical data. Higher r2, and lower 
AAD and SSE, indicate a better fit. As r2 was consistently 
above .93, .92, .90, and .85, for the 300k, 15k, 3k, and 1k 
nets, respectively, this measure was of little value for 
discriminating the effect of the parameter change. AAD and 
SSE produced more differentiated results. We focus on 
AAD here (With few exceptions, SSE produced similar 
results).  
Figure 3 shows how AAD varies as a function of the 
transition-time and Net Size. One can see that, for all nets 
except the 300k net, the minimum AAD value is close to 
that obtained with 125 ms. However, a better approximation 
is obtained when the transition-time is optimised for each 
Net Size. Goodness of fit with the optimal transition-time 
for each Net Size (325 ms, 175 ms, 100 ms, and 75 ms, for 
the 300k, 15k, 3k, and 1k nets respectively) is reported in 
Table 1. As can be seen, there is actually a strong positive 
relationship between optimal transition-time and the Net 
Size, meaning that the fit improves if the stronger simulated 
players use a longer translation time.   
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Figure 3: Absolute Average Deviation as a function of 
size of net and shifting time. The vertical arrow is placed at 
125 ms, the value used in the main simulations of this paper. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Goodness of fit for (a) the shifting value being 
equal to 125 ms for the four nets, and (b) the shifting values 
optimising AAD for each skill level. 
 
 net size       shift time   r2 AAD  SSE  
 
(a) Fit with 125ms for all nets 
300k  125 0.94   5.1      165.7 
15k  125 0.94   2.6 42.2 
3k  125 0.91   2.7 44.4 
1k  125 0.90   2.2 30.5 
    
Average  0.92   3.1 70.7 
 
(b) Fit with time values minimizing AAD 
300k  325 0.95   2.7 52.6  
15k  175 0.94   2.3 32.0  
3k  100 0.90   2.6 44.0  
1k   75 0.89   2.1 35.5  
     
Average  0.92   2.4 41.0  
Discussion 
The simulations carried out by Waters and Gobet (2008) 
on the recall of intersection positions showed that CHREST 
made several correct predictions with respect to the 
mechanisms putatively carried out in the mind’s eye. The 
predictions were made with parameters that were set a 
priori and independently from the data. Thus, the time 
parameters of CHREST were also well supported, in 
particular the shifting time for re-centring pieces. This value 
(125 ms) provided a fairly good fit for the data for all nets 
(see Figure 2 and Table 1). In general, the data supported 
the idea that pieces must be re-centred in the mind’s eye 
before pattern recognition can happen, and they also 
provided support for the assumption that the shifting time 
would be 125 ms. 
These results were satisfactory, considering that CHREST 
was not developed ad hoc to account for the results of the 
intersection experiment and that it makes absolute 
predictions about performance. However, an important 
scientific question is to know the extent to which the 
simulations could be improved by optimising some of the 
model’s parameters. This was the aim of this paper, which 
we addressed by carrying out a sensitivity analysis on the 
shifting time parameter.     
As expected, increasing the transition time from 0 to 450 
ms led to poorer recall over all position types. In addition, 
the sensitivity analysis revealed that the best fit was 
obtained with a shifting time (325 ms) for the 300k-chunk 
net that was of longer duration than the values for the 
smaller nets (Table 2). In general, the shifting times 
producing the best fit were positively correlated with skill 
(as estimated by the number of chunks), which is somewhat 
counter-intuitive. One would have expected that strong 
players should be faster in moving pieces in their mind’s 
eye. A likely explanation for this unexpected result is that 
stronger players keep more pieces in the mind’s eye, and 
that this produces an overhead affecting piece translation. 
That is, in our simulations, shifting pieces to the centre of 
the square was the only process that was assumed to be new 
in the intersection condition, and the impact of this process 
was a direct function of the shifting time. However, it is 
plausible that, as more pieces are held in the mind’s eye – 
and the model assumes that chunks held in visual STM are 
automatically unpacked in the mind’s eye, with the 
consequence that stronger players hold more pieces there – 
additional processes must happen to refresh the mental 
images. For example, Kosslyn (1994, p. 322) assumes that 
“the amount of material one can hold in an image is limited 
by the number of stored units that can be activated at the 
same time, for the following reasons: Each unit is activated 
individually, and time is required for each operation. And as 
soon as a unit has been activated, the image begins to fade 
[…].” Thus, the fact that slow values give a better fit with 
stronger players may be an artefact of the fact that we did 
not simulate in detail how information in the mind’s eye is 
maintained to counteract decay.  
Waters and Gobet (2008) carried out the simulations this 
way in order to keep the model as close as possible to earlier 
simulations, but it now appears that in this instance the 
model may have been too simple: while the simulations 
presented in that paper accounted for the data reasonably 
well, the sensitivity analysis pinpointed one aspect of the 
model that needs further development. Later versions of 
CHREST will have to take into consideration the detail of 
how the mind’s eye generates and maintains visual images. 
This will also make it possible to simulate the Stroop-like 
difference in recall of bishops and knights found by Waters 
and Gobet (2008), which the current version of the model 
cannot account for. 
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